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abstRact: While there is a steadily growing literature on epistemic injustice in health-
care, there are few discussions of the role that biomedical technologies play in 
harming patients in their capacity as knowers. Through an analysis of newborn and 
pediatric genetic and genomic sequencing technologies (GSTs), I argue that bio-
medical technologies can lead to epistemic injustice through two primary pathways: 
epistemic capture and value partitioning. I close by discussing the larger ethical and politi-
cal context of critical analyses of GSTs and their broader implications for just and 
equitable healthcare delivery.
Access to basic healthcare and equal forms of medical care is considered 
essential on distributive theories of justice (Daniels 1979). Yet, the practice 
of medicine is a human affair, and humans are notoriously prone to obsti-
nate cognitive biases (Kahneman 2013). Such biases result in medical errors 
that would undermine diagnosis, treatment, and care even in ideal health-
care systems. Furthermore, there is a steadily growing body of research 
examining how such biases give rise to medical errors that are not equally 
shared by all, but instead disproportionately affect the health outcomes of 
vulnerable medical patients and historically oppressed patient populations 
(Reiheld 2010; Carel and Kidd 2014; Blease et al. 2017; Maina et al. 2018, 
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Reynolds and Peña-Guzmán 2019). This research, which typically focuses 
on patterns of patient-provider communication, institutional norms, and 
the effects of historical and sociopolitical factors on medical practice, also 
makes plain how such cognitive biases are rooted in oppressive systems 
and processes of racism, sexism, cissexism, ableism, and classism, et al. 
However, there is little work on the ways in which the development and 
use of recent biomedical technologies themselves contribute to epistemic 
injustice in healthcare and beyond. In this essay, I address this lacuna by 
exploring the role that biomedical technologies play in harming patients in 
their capacity as knowers.
Criticisms of new technologies, including biomedical technologies, 
invariably run the risk of overgeneralization. To appropriately restrict 
the scope of my analysis, I focus upon clinical applications of genetic and 
genomic sequencing technologies, including whole genome and whole 
exome sequencing as well as chromosomal microarray, and I do so with 
respect to return of results of variants of unknown or highly variable 
significance in prenatal and pediatric settings. I believe that my argu-
ments extend to other sorts of technology, biomedical and otherwise, but 
I do not put forward the case for that extension here. For shorthand, I 
will refer to these jointly as genetic and genomic screening technologies (GSTs). 
Given the purposes at hand, I group these technologies together because 
of the way in which they each produce excess information beyond the 
discrete, animating clinical concerns in any given case and thereby pro-
duce information that can be medically unactionable or fundamentally 
ambiguous.
My central argument is that GSTs cause epistemic injustice through 
what I call epistemic capture and value partitioning. Epistemic capture occurs 
when fundamentally ambiguous information is transformed into and treated 
as definite knowledge. Value partitioning occurs when variously available 
hermeneutical resources are restricted to an inappropriately simplistic eval-
uative scale or set of appraisals. In the cases of GSTs, this restriction leaves 
open just two possible appraisals: positive or negative.1
I begin by analyzing a set of qualitative research detailing the psycho-
social impact of GSTs in the aforementioned clinical settings. Then, I lay 
out the argument that GSTs cause epistemic injustice through epistemic 
capture and value partitioning. I close the paper by discussing the larger 
ethical and political context of critical analyses of GSTs as well as the 
1 Of course, the concept of value partitioning could describe a situation where the scale 
consists of more than two values or where a given set of appraisals operates with an intricate 
and far more complex relationship than that discussed here.
163HOW BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES HARM PATIENTS AS KNOWERS
broader implications of this analysis for addressing epistemic injustice in 
healthcare and for the practice of just and equitable healthcare delivery 
more generally.
Three initial clarificatory comments are in order. First, my use of the 
term “epistemic injustice” goes beyond its typical scope in much of the lit-
erature (Fricker 2007; Hookway 2010; Kidd et al. 2017). I focus neither on 
harms caused by another individual such as one’s provider, nor on harms 
caused by institutions. Instead, I focus on harms caused by the epistemic 
frameworks at play in the development and use of biomedical technologies, 
which is to say, in the interpretation of the data and information they 
produce as well as in the many practices and activities such interpretations 
generate and shape. Put differently, my focus is on harms resulting from the 
specific hermeneutical resources and processes put to work by and through 
biomedical technologies in the sorts of cases under discussion. In this way, 
I hope to contribute not only to the literature on epistemic injustice, but 
also to the more specific project of understanding how “certain newborn 
screening results,” as well as pediatric screening results, “have been demon-
strated to cause distress, alter behavior, and even to influence the formation 
of new parental and family identities” (Grob et al. 2018). I leave open for 
future research the extent to which this analysis applies to GSTs in different 
clinical contexts and cases, including returning results other than those dis-
cussed here, and I also leave open the extent to which this analysis applies 
to different sorts of technology.
Second, when one studies biomedical technology, one is dealing with 
an especially complicated phenomenon. With respect to a technology 
like whole-genome sequencing, for example, there are hundreds, if not 
thousands of people who play roles in the many processes leading up to 
and extending through its clinical applications as they exist today, rang-
ing from computer scientists and lab technicians to various clinicians and 
genetic counselors. “Biomedical technology” often functions as a synecdo-
che for a large and labyrinthian network of interactions between a variety 
of actors in biomedicine and a host of technological tools and processes. 
In short, this complexity makes “biomedical technology” a difficult object 
for epistemological inquiry, including “genomic sequencing technologies” 
more specifically. Speaking of the practices and concerns captured by the 
umbrella terms “genetics” and “genomics” as well as “postgenomics,” 
Colin Koopman rightly notes that “it is by no means the case that these 
varied scientific projects are all, at bottom, somehow the same. Rather, 
there is increasing complexity in the very practice of the genetic sciences” 
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(forthcoming). One upshot of my analysis is that studies of epistemic injus-
tice in relation to biomedical technologies may present special methodolog-
ical issues and require a thoroughly interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary 
approach.
Third, insofar as epistemic injustice contributes to distributive injustices 
(Coady 2017), it is a compounding form of injustice in the context of the 
US healthcare system, for this system is infamously unjust and inequitable 
both historically and today (Washington 2008). Writing about biomedical 
technologies is an inherently political endeavor if for no other reason than 
that many of the technologies discussed in journals of philosophy, sociology, 
anthropology, bioethics, and public policy are technologies that the major-
ity of humans on Earth cannot access. That they cannot do so is not pri-
marily a question of bad luck, but of histories of colonization and imperialism 
(Wolfe 2006). The benefits of GSTs, for instance, are typically enjoyed by 
a demographically small slice of the white, middle- to upper-middle class in 
the global North. Until the profound inequality of access to such biomedical 
technologies is addressed, inquiries such as the one I am undertaking risk 
missing the actual moral and political forest for the privileged trees.2 I take 
this concern very seriously and discuss it at length in the concluding section 
of the paper.
1. GENETIC AND GENOMIC SEQUENCING TECHNOLOGIES
GSTs have been used in clinical settings for decades. These technologies 
use modern computing power to analyze particular portions of the genetic 
material in a human organism primarily with the aim of detecting medically 
actionable (or potentially medically actionable) variants. Since 2010, the 
American College of Medical Genetics has supported chromosomal 
microarray as a first-tier test for individuals with several types of suspected 
genetic diseases (Miller et al. 2010). Whole genome sequencing (WGS) tech-
nologies, unlike chromosomal microarray and other methods that sequence 
individual genes or specific sets of genes, analyze the entire genome of an 
organism, including chromosomal as well as mitochondrial DNA. WGS 
2 See “Access to Healthcare,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, https ://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fasta ts/access- 
to-health-care.htm. My thanks to Chris Lebron for graciously leading me to engage these 
concerns in far greater depth.
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provides significantly more data and is increasingly preferred by clinicians 
as a diagnostic test.3
However, due to their breadth and depth, these tests can uncover infor-
mation that is incidental to the initial concerns that prompted the test in the 
first place. This includes information that can be fundamentally ambiguous 
and, at times, without known medical significance. As Eric Green, director 
of the National Human Genome Research Institute at the NIH put it in 
2016, “we are overwhelmed by the amount of data coming out of these 
sequencing instruments . . . it’s a new circumstance . . . reading out a 
genome sequence is not the hard part [anymore]; the hard part is progress-
ing on and figuring out what to do with the information about the variants 
in our genomes.”4 This situation is historically unprecedented, and it is 
faced by clinicians and researchers at the same time that whole genome 
sequencing and related techniques become more common in clinical and 
other settings that translate the findings of basic research.
As Khoury et al. argue, “Our current translation landscape in genomic 
medicine has major gaps. The science of gene discovery is relatively well 
funded and moving forward at a rapid pace, yet the translation sciences, 
including both clinical trials and large, well-designed observational stud-
ies, are lagging behind. Often, a gene discovery per se is simply assumed 
(incorrectly) to have clinical validity and utility for the practice of medicine 
(for example, genetic variants for susceptibility to diabetes…)” (2008). Put 
bluntly, the tools to meaningfully understand a significant chunk of the raw 
data being produced are lacking.
3 A recent study in the European Journal of Human Genetics concluded that “initial evidence 
suggests that the diagnostic performance of WGS is superior to conventional genetic tests,” 
such as chromosomal microarray. Although the overall cost-effectiveness is currently unclear, 
the authors of that study state that “it is expected that technical costs associated with high 
throughput sequencing will continue to decrease and that diagnostic performance will con-
tinue to improve” (Hayeems et al. 2017). A more recent metaanalysis suggested that “among 
studies published in 2017, the diagnostic utility of WGS was significantly greater than CMA.” 
The authors also noted that “the diagnostic utility of WGS and WES [whole-exome sequenc-
ing] were not significantly different” (Clark et al. 2018). Whole-exome sequencing, in contrast 
to whole-genome sequencing, focuses specifically on the ~1.5–2% of genes that code for 
proteins. In summary, it is likely that the clinical use of whole genome and exome sequencing 
across a wide range of therapeutic contexts will continue to grow in the coming years, over-
taking older and more limited GSTs, such as chromosomal microarray. It is also likely that 
whole genome and exome sequencing will become increasingly incorporated into clinical 
contexts wherein GSTs were used less frequently in the past and also increasingly used in 
contexts where GSTs have already made inroads.
4 See Eric Green, “The Genomic Landscape circa 2016,” part of a conference on Current 
Topics in Genome Analysis 2016, hosted by the NHGRI on February 24, 2016. Available at 
https ://www.youtu be.com/watch ?v=mhD3-_5Ee-A.
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This is therefore an especially important juncture to investigate the epis-
temic frameworks shaping our efforts to interpret genomic data and the 
effects these frameworks, these efforts, and our interpretations have on all 
those who interact with and are affected by genomics research. It is in this 
light that I begin with an analysis of recent qualitative studies detailing how 
parents interpret genetic and genomic sequencing results.
2. KNOWLEDGE, MEANING, AND GSTS
Werner-Lin et al. (2017) report the case of a mother who underwent chro-
mosomal microarray screening and whose baby tested positive for a copy 
number variant with a highly variable phenotype. The mother reported 
that provider reactions ran the gamut from:
“Doom and gloom” to “(t)his baby’s perfectly fine, why are they putting you 
through this?” As her daughter reached 6 months, she said: “I’m constantly ques-
tioning ‘is this because of her disorder?’ For example, she’s a really bad sleeper so 
for the longest time I thought ‘wow, is this her deletion or is it just that she’s five 
months old and she sucks at sleeping like most babies?’” (Werner-Lin et al. 2017)
Even though the meaning of the baby’s “deletion” was fundamentally 
uncertain, and even though the opposing responses from providers demon-
strated this, this mother struggled to resist taking the ambiguity of the GST 
information to be knowledge of something being wrong. Another parent said,
Once or twice it’s crept into my head where I’ve been like “what if this microarray 
result . . . like there’s something wrong with her and we don’t know and one day 
she just has SIDS [sudden infant death syndrome] and stops breathing.” She’s got 
such a strangely mellow temperament, so I think, “is there something wrong with 
her that she’s just so lovely”—which makes no sense. (447)
“Which makes no sense.” This parent, even more explicitly than the one 
quoted beforehand, recognizes that it is unreasonable to take the uncertainty 
of the copy number variant to be evidence of, to be a piece of knowledge 
demonstrating or suggesting that, something is wrong. Yet, the epistemic 
inertia from uncertainty and ambiguity to certainty and clarity that some-
thing is wrong is powerful enough that some parents even began entertaining 
concerns about assumed social repercussions and difficulties. Another said,
I never shared it [the results] with any family [members]. My dad would treat 
[the child] differently even though the results don’t say anything definitive. If she 
drops a ball or says something really stupid, he would say “oh, there’s something 
wrong with her; she’s retarded, or she’s autistic.” He would just go there. (449)
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“Even though the results don't say anything definitive.” In each of these cases, the 
epistemic (and existential) inertia generated by the uncertainty does not lead 
to the general assumption that their child may have something different 
about them; it leads more specifically to the assumption that they will have 
a disability, an impairment, and one that causes disadvantage—that will, it 
is assumed, make their life, on the whole, go worse.
Take the case of a mother who had been told that the screening results 
for her newborn suggested the possibility of PKU (Phenylketonuria), but 
not definitively so. She originally “sloughed off” the information. And yet, 
she stated,
Then you go on the Internet and it’s, like, if the levels are like this, you know he’ll 
become retarded. He’s losing IQ points by the second. And I’m, like, oh, my gosh! 
I’m looking at him, and, like, he seems fine. Is his brain, you know, getting destroyed 
by the protein that’s in my breast milk? (Timmermans and Buchbinder 2010)5
“You know he’ll become retarded.” Here, the clinical encounter itself does not 
directly animate the shift from ambiguity to certainty to specific concerns 
about disability. Instead, a complex, social repository of varying forms of 
information (the internet) leads to it. The levels, which are in fact ambig-
uous, are taken to be definitive. And the experiential outcome of that 
taken-as-definite-knowledge is further interpreted to mean: “you know he’ll 
become retarded.”
Even when screening results were not related to the initial reasons for 
a diagnostic test, in one study parents reported “a sense of self-imposed 
obligation to take on the ‘weight’ of knowing [this information], however 
unpleasant” (Anderson et al. 2016). Parents reported a duty to know if 
something was wrong, even after being told that incidental or secondary 
variant information could be ambiguous and without actionable medical 
significance. Based on this study, it seems as though the very framework of 
GSTs creates—or at least sustains—a pressure to know. One parent stated,
How is he supposed to go on and live a happy and productive life . . . when . . . 
he has pretty much a guillotine hanging over his head of all these possible things 
that are going to go wrong? (Anderson et al. 2016)
“All these possible things that are going to go wrong.” This prima facie contradic-
tory phrase lays bare the existential impact of GSTs in cases such as 
5 This last study is with respect to tandem mass spectrometry technology for metabolic 
diseases, which are screened via a blood sample. I do not have space here to defend this 
claim, but I would argue that the results hold, ceteris paribus, for my claims about the epistemic 
framework of WGS/WES/CM.
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these.6 A fundamentally ambiguous piece of information, a possibility 
untethered to evidence of the sort that is to be modern medicine’s life-
blood, transfigures into a piece of knowledge that something bad is going 
to befall one’s child—and that something bad is their becoming disabled. 
I will now turn to use the tools of social epistemology to better understand 
how and why this happens as well as what harms such situations bring 
about.
3. THE EPISTEMIC FRAMEWORK OF GSTS
In each of these examples and the larger studies of which they are a part, 
parents struggle with the epistemic framework and processes put to work 
by and through these genetic and genomic screening tests. In the analysis 
that follows, I will focus on the concepts undergirding GSTs in order to 
understand the larger epistemic framework at play. In other words, I aim 
to show how these concepts shape larger patterns of knowing and interpre-
tation in these contexts.
I take this route for a number of reasons. First and foremost, I find the 
concepts central to the development, production, use, and interpretation of 
GSTs—the conceptual architecture of GSTs, if you will—to fruitfully reveal 
the epistemological milieu that patients find themselves in when working to 
make meaning out of the information put before them.7 The concepts at 
play, then, are an especially fertile starting point to understand the larger 
epistemological framework in question because, as I hope to show below, 
they reveal the epistemological landscape at work in the lived experience of 
receiving and interpreting its outputs, which is to say, the lived experience 
of taking up and dealing with their meaningfulness.
Furthermore, I follow feminist theorists, critical race theorists, and crit-
ical disability theorists, among others, in understanding moral labor to 
centrally involve conceptual analysis as guided by empirical reality, which is 
to say, conceptual analysis as guided by the actual conditions under which 
people live and with special attention to histories of oppression and extant 
social hierarchies. As Charles Mills puts it in, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,”
6 As an anonymous reviewer rightly pointed out, there is a large literature on risk and on 
health risks in particular. That literature is surely a boon to understanding situations like 
these, but I do not have the space to engage it here. A more detailed analysis of the specific 
role conceptions of risk play in relationship to the arguments presented in this piece would 
require a future study.
7 Following scholars in science and technology studies, I take this milieu to ultimately 
touch upon everything from informatics to economics to local, national, and global politics 
(Reardon 2018).
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Moral cognition is no more just a matter of naïve direct perception than empirical 
cognition is . . . concepts are necessary to apprehend things, both in the empirical 
and moral realm. But once one recognizes (unlike Kant) the huge range of possible 
conceptual systems, then . . . concern about conceptual adequacy becomes crucial. 
. . . It will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial 
realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, 
concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether 
in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of 
the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the 
way the boundaries are drawn. (Mills 2005, 174–75)
One of the ways that dominant concepts obscure instead of illuminate is 
by hiding their status as concepts—by passing as facts of the matter instead 
of, as they in fact are, determinate for and shaping of interpretation and 
judgment.
With these concerns in mind, consider the diversity of dominant, orga-
nizing concepts at play in GSTs: disease, disorder, variation, mutation, risk, 
and typicality, among others.8 If one heeds research in the philosophy of 
medicine as informed by the philosophy of disability and critical disability 
theory, these seemingly diverse and complex terms are grounded in just one 
foundational concept: the norm (or, if one prefers it phrased as a state or 
quality, normality).9 As I have argued elsewhere in light of that research, 
normality “is the glue that renders any given modern concept of health, 
illness, or disease coherent. Just as one must assume or construct a moral 
exemplar in order to articulate a theory of virtue, one must assume or con-
struct a [“normal”] psycho-physiological exemplar in order to articulate a 
theory of health, illness, and disease” (Reynolds 2018a). Though the con-
cept ultimately originates out of statistics, management sciences, and shifts 
in modes of governance in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it easily 
and too often functions ontologically and normatively—it is taken as a mea-
sure of how things are and should be (Davis 1995).
While normality can be applied to any number of phenomena, in each 
case, its hermeneutical or interpretative function is to bifurcate. Normality 
is a binary concept. It serves to divide and divide into just two sorts with 
opposite valences. If a phenomenon is not normal, it is abnormal, regardless 
of whether its abnormality is construed as deficiency or excess. In some 
8 This claim is easily substantiated by even a cursory search of any leading genetics- 
focused scholarly journals. To take one historically momentous example—and one which 
centrally deploys all of these concepts—see (International Human Genome Sequencing 
Consortium et al. 2001).
9 This is a very large literature that I cannot rehearse here, but the following are espe-
cially helpful entry points: Kukla (2015), Silvers (1998), and Amundson (2000).
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medical contexts and with respect to some medical phenomena, the line 
between these two domains is understood as involving some amount of 
ambiguity. For example, it is not the case that a blood sugar level of 239 is 
normal and 240 is abnormal; they both straddle a point that has been 
established to be of clinical significance and both would be flagged as prob-
lematic.10 While the specific demarcation between normality and abnor-
mality involves pragmatic decisions that are often, or at least ideally, based 
upon a rich and varied data set, it is nevertheless the case that the concep-
tual binary of normal/abnormal is regulative for genomic sciences. That is 
to say, it guides and orients how phenomena that fall under its scope of 
analysis are understood. The concept of normality, acting as the foundation 
of the epistemic framework of GSTs, structures information according to 
the binary distinction between the normal (positive) and the abnormal (neg-
ative) (Waldschmidt 2005).11
If one recalls the longitudinal study from a newborn screening context 
cited earlier, parents who received a report of some genetic abnormality—
even if its eventual expression was uncertain due to significant phenotypic 
variability or due to some other reason—started treating their child as 
already “sick” (Timmermans and Buchbinder 2010). In light of this evi-
dence, the authors of that study suggest that newborn genetic and genomic 
screening can lead parents to treat their children as permanent “patients-in-
waiting.” Because of the value we place on being “normal,” parents inter-
pret risks, probabilities, and even unknowns as evidence of fated, feared 
things unseen, as evidence of knowledge that something is or will be wrong in 
and for the life of their child. But what, precisely, does this knowledge mean 
for parents? And do the specific hermeneutical resources and processes put 
to work by and through GSTs, as well as the outputs of those processes, in 
fact constitute a harm to parents in their capacity as knowers?
3.1. The Epistemic Harm of GSTs
Using examples drawn from qualitative sociological research conducted in 
clinical settings, I have suggested that the epistemic framework of genetic 
and genomic sequencing is defined by the concept of normality. I fur-
ther claimed that this concept, which is operative in everything from the 
demand to create these technologies to the sociocultural milieu of parents 
and clinicians who use them, ultimately functions to classify results into one 
10 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
11 It should go without saying that abnormality can be transformed into normality if it fits 
within a valued social practice.
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of two domains, normal and abnormal, and one of two respective values, 
positive and negative. I have not yet explained, however, why the effects 
of this framework constitute an epistemic harm in the senses explored by 
social epistemologists.
The way in which GSTS are put to work cause harm to people in 
their capacity as knowers through two pathways: epistemic capture and 
value partitioning. Epistemic capture occurs when fundamentally ambiguous 
information is transformed into and treated as definite forms of knowledge. 
Value partitioning occurs when variously available hermeneutical resources 
are restricted to an inappropriately simplistic evaluative scale or set of 
appraisals. As suggested above, this restriction leaves open just two possi-
ble appraisals in the aforementioned cases of GSTs: positive or negative. 
Epistemic capture mobilizes hermeneutically ambiguous resources as if they 
are not ambiguous. It passes off fundamentally ambiguous or underde-
termined genomic knowledge as if it is reliable diagnostic and prognostic 
information when it is not. Because of the role played by the concept of 
normality in genomic sciences in conjunction with the broader social and 
cultural prevalence of ableism, this can lead directly to value partitioning. 
This feature of GSTs, as they are in fact put to work in relation to the man-
ifold epistemic agents who interact with them, filter lives into being either 
“positive” or “negative,” either “good” or “bad.”
Note that the restrictions GSTs place on the relevant hermeneutical 
resources are many. To borrow a term from Eric Schwitzgebel, there is 
what could be called morphological prejudice with respect to assumptions con-
cerning the variability of forms of the human body and mind.12 Of course, 
the idea that there is a “standard” human form is created and gains steam 
in a specific historical context. That idea requires active ignorance of the de 
facto range of shapes, sizes, looks, forms, and styles of being of human ani-
mals. It also requires active ignorance of the social and political stakes of 
normalization (Bashford and Levine 2010; Lombardo 2011).
There is also hedonic prejudice with respect to assumptions concerning 
which forms of human life are germane to flourishing and which are not.13 
To assume that a clinically significant genomic variation (not to mention a 
variant of unknown significance) is automatically negative in the sense of 
foreclosing one’s potential flourishing is misguided. Lastly, there is scientific 
12 Eric Schwitzgebel, “The Splintered Skeptic: Eric Schwitzgebel interviewed by Richard 
Marshall,” 3:AM Magazine, Jan. 20, 2012, https ://www.3amma gazine.com/3am/the-splin 
tered-skept ic/.
13 On this point, see especially Elizabeth Barnes’s arguments for a mere-difference view 
of disability (Barnes 2016).
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prejudice with respect to assumptions concerning the authority of the modern 
life sciences to determine the meaningfulness of a life, the forms life can 
take, and the flourishing various forms of life enjoy.
Crucially, what makes the restriction of value partitioning indefensible 
also turns on whether the hermeneutic resources in play reasonably include 
the views, experiences, resources, and research relative to the phenomena 
over which they are taken to have epistemic purchase and the people who 
have lived, embodied knowledge of those phenomena. This is not simply a 
question of epistemic error, but also of injustice, for these restrictions func-
tion to uphold extant systems of oppression, systems that subordinate his-
torically oppressed and marginalized groups. It is a question of what Kristie 
Doston has called “contributory injustice” and an instance of what Gaile 
Pohlhaus Jr. calls willful hermeneutical ignorance (Dotson 2012; Pohlhaus 
2012). That is to say, in order to take the binary value partitioning in ques-
tion as accurate, one must actively ignore all of the testimony and bodies of 
knowledge that, if taken seriously, would undermine it.
A more capacious definition can now be offered: GTSs contribute to 
epistemic injustice by (a) transforming ambiguous information into definite 
forms of knowledge taken to be true and (b) restricting variously available 
hermeneutical resources used to interpret that knowledge—knowledge con-
cerning health states, bodily transitions and variation, the communities that 
form around them, and the life course as whole—to a binary set of domains, 
values, and meaning: the domain normal/abnormal, the values positive/negative, 
and the meaning everything's fine/something's wrong.14 In the cases I have exam-
ined, value partitioning occurs after or along with epistemic capture, though 
I would offer that value partitioning functions in these ways even when 
epistemic capture is not at play, such as when a diagnostic and/or prognos-
tic result is more or less clear-cut.
There is a further prejudice at work here, however, and one which is per-
haps primary or at least a lodestar. If one considers the sociocultural context 
in which “either something is wrong or everything is right” becomes mean-
ingful, this sort of epistemic partitioning feeds upon and propagates ableism. 
By ableism, I mean the assumption that being able-bodied and “normal” is 
better than being disabled and “abnormal” and the many discriminations 
14 To be clear, by the term “domain,” I mean it the sense of “a sphere of thought or 
action; field, province, scope of a department of knowledge, etc.” OED, “domain, n.” def. 4a. 
Put simply, I mean a domain as that framework which affords phenomenon interpreted 
within its scope meaning and does so in determinate or essential ways.
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and oppressions people with disabilities face as a result of this assumption. 
In short, ableism refers to the privileging of able-bodiedness. As it functions 
in the cases under discussion, value partitioning is fundamentally ableist. It 
contributes to an ideology that devalues people with disabilities because it 
narrows how and what people know concerning how bodies and minds are, 
can, and should be. Value partitioning excludes and limits the epistemic 
space in which, and resources about which, people conceive of and judge 
the range and wellbeing of bodies and minds.
3.2. Ableism and Epistemic Harm
However, it is not just ableism in general that is to blame. Part of the 
reason the specific hermeneutical resources and processes put to work by 
and through GSTs take this binary partitioned form is because of the ableist 
conflation of experiences of disability with experiences of pain, suffering, and 
disadvantage. This assumption has many epistemic ramifications in terms 
of how people judge, interpret, and understand their own lives as well as 
that of others. What is more, this assumption has historically had and still 
has today many material effects, including a panoply of discriminations, 
oppressions, and historical injustices against people with disabilities across 
the globe (Erevelles 2011; Nielsen 2012). One of the reasons people with 
disabilities have been among the first targeted by various eugenic programs 
historically has not simply been a question of “fitness,” but also of the fact 
that their lives are assumed to be fundamentally suffered—lives “no one 
would want” or, in the Third Reich’s formulation, “life unworthy of life” 
(Garland-Thomson 2015a; Kittay 2016).
Because enormous value is tied to being normal and because negative 
health risks are tied, as if an ominous bow, to being abnormal, the knowl-
edge produced by this epistemic framework is not animated by a simple 
desire to learn, but instead a charged desire to know—to definitively know 
on which of the two sides, normal or abnormal, one’s child or oneself falls 
(Waldschmidt 2005). For many parents, this is the binary division upon 
which a life worth living or, at minimum, a life enjoyed falls. When considered 
in this light, everything's fine/something's wrong in fact means my child is not 
disabled/my child might be or become disabled. It is hard to overstate the psycho-
social impact of uncritical belief in this binary division. Yet, as I hope to 
have made clear, it is only under the sway of ableism that something being 
“wrong” with one’s child comes to mean that they are or will become “dis-
abled” in a negative sense of that term.
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In at least the cases under discussion, GSTs put to work a deeply prob-
lematic binary framework. This should give pause for proponents who sug-
gest that the information produced by GSTs and the methods to interpret 
and communicate about them are in fact far more complex and diverse. 
Insofar as ableism is a bulwark of injustice and insofar as biomedical insti-
tutions and practitioners are committed to justice, epistemic capture and 
value partitioning result in epistemic harms that need to be addressed and 
remedied.
Anthropological and historical evidence suggests an extremely wide range 
of ideas and attitudes about the numerous forms of embodiment that today 
fall under the term “disability.”15 Even if the issue of epistemic capture in 
these cases were sufficiently addressed by, for example, withholding infor-
mation concerning variants of unknown significance, insofar as the epis-
temic framework of GSTs involve value partitioning, such technology would 
still impede people from appreciating the diversity of forms of embodiment, 
health trajectories, and flourishing bodies, minds, and communities in terms 
other than something's wrong/they might be or become disabled or everything's fine/
they are not disabled.
One might object that this is not a problem of the technology in ques-
tion, but of the interpreter(s) of its output. I find this objection to fail 
because it inappropriately narrows the interpretative field in question to the 
particular epistemic state of individual agents: in the cases under discussion, 
parents and practitioners. But knowledge is fundamentally and irremediably 
social, and these technologies have been developed, propagated, refined, 
and interpreted at every step by humans and in the context of large-scale 
human institutions, such as the practice of modern medicine in general and 
the development of the HGP in particular.
Furthermore, these clinical contexts involve epistemic agents who are 
fundamentally asymmetrical with respect to their epistemic authority. 
Practitioners are experts and patients are not. People assume that if experts 
are telling them that there is a finding, this must be because this finding 
matters (otherwise it would not be mentioned). What is more, because doc-
tors and institutions lend legitimacy to GSTs by using them and charging 
money for them, it is reasonable that patients will trust these technologies 
even when the results are, in fact, useless or potentially useless data with 
15 Instructively, few of these fit into ideas of normality or abnormality operative in the 
production and interpretation of genomic knowledge (Kasnitz and Shuttleworth 2001; Reid-
Cunningham 2009). As debates over everything from deafness to neurodiversity evidence, 
such differing attitudes are alive and well today (Davis 2006; Mauldin 2016).
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respect to promoting positive health outcomes. The fact that variants of 
unknown significance are of unknown significance is undermined by the 
default assumption that if they were not significant, they would not be com-
municated about and would not be part of the practice of GSTs.
But it is not just a question of how a given individual practitioner man-
ages this authority. A practitioner who tries to counter this assumption is 
likely going to fail because it runs counter to the logic of communicating 
the results of a test, which is to say, a logic where information that has no 
actionable meaning is not a “result” at all. From the perspective of parents 
interviewed above, the fate of their child’s life and wellbeing may ultimately 
be at stake. In these clinical contexts, the existential stakes desiccate all the 
force of “unknown” and transfer it to “significance.” In short, patients hear 
information about these variants not in terms of unknown significance, but 
unknown significance.
To make matters more complicated, when it comes to interpret-
ing sequencing results, providers can find themselves deferring to other 
experts—whether it be genetic counselors, technicians at the lab(s) where 
the sequencing was performed, or specialists of another sort. Although there 
are strong pushes for the increasing incorporation of genomic information 
into clinical settings, too many practitioners lack substantive knowledge 
about the current state of genomics (Houwink et al. 2012). This lack of 
expertise is yet another reason why value partitioning is such a pernicious 
effect of GSTs: the requisite knowledge to interpret genomic information in 
a nonbinary, nonableist way appears to be lacking not only for the majority 
of patients, but perhaps even for the majority of providers. I address how 
to rectify this issue in section 4 below.
One might also object that there is a third domain at play here: neither 
“something’s wrong,” nor “everything’s fine,” but that of the unknown, 
indeterminate, or ambiguous. This objection turns on treating the latter as 
its own category. On the contrary, I find the social scientific research cited 
above to instead suggest that parents in fact interpret indeterminate results 
as “negative,” “most likely negative,” or, perhaps most accurately, “not 
positive.” Indeed, one of the effects of epistemic capture and value parti-
tioning is to close down interpretive avenues that would better deal with the 
ambiguity that the information provided by GSTs in fact present.16
It is important to remember that patients invariably interpret medical 
information in existential terms. That is to say, the ultimate meaning of 
16 As Chris Lebron pointed out to me, this is surely a form of disciplining in Foucault’s 
sense of the term (1979). I sadly do not have space to take up that line of interpretation.
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biomedical information and knowledge is determined relative to the mean-
ing of one’s life and the various knowledge at one’s disposal about it. Insofar 
as most people do not know that there can be health within illness (Lindsey 
1996), that disability is often positive and is not the same as either disease 
or illness (Davis 2013), and other such evidence from disability commu-
nities, the process of epistemic capture and value partitioning at work in 
GSTs forces parents into one side or the other of its epistemic framework, 
rendering information that straddles the divide or shows the divide to be 
misleading difficult to understand.
This is especially problematic in light of the fact that far too much of 
the research on patient empowerment is carried out in an uncritical mode 
(Calvillo et al. 2015). That literature often assumes that the more medical 
knowledge and expertise patients gain, the better, never considering that 
the very concepts, epistemic frameworks, and other components of mod-
ern medical knowing and practice itself might themselves be problematic. 
When placed in the context of their development, production, use, and 
contexts of interpretation and meaning, the process of epistemic capture 
and value partitioning that biomedical technologies put to work rely upon 
and actively foster ableist intuitions, and it will take concerted critical work 
to combat these effects.
4. THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY AT THE 
INTERSECTION OF BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH
I said above that writing about biomedical technologies is an inherently 
political endeavor. It is so for many reasons, not least of which is the fact 
that many, if not most of the technologies discussed in academic journals 
of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, bioethics, and public policy are 
technologies that the vast majority of humans on Earth cannot access or 
to which they have limited access. For example, limiting the scope just to 
the United States, the basic structures of this settler nation-state not only 
fail to distribute basic goods such as healthcare services to all its citizens, 
but are also historically based in a market and political system built upon 
fundamentally unjust institutions such as slavery and upon the inequality of 
persons based upon considerations of race, ethnicity, sex, gender, sexuality, 
physical and mental ability, and so on (Beckert and Rockman 2016; Jay 
and Lyerly 2016). In many different respects, this has continued through 
to today (Alexander 2012; McWhorter 2017). What, then, does it mean for 
bioethicists to engage questions of injustice in the context of a larger system 
that is profoundly unjust, both historically and today?
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I agree with Josephine Johnston and Eric Jungst when they write, “resolv-
ing the predictive uncertainties of genomic information is the professional 
responsibility of the biomedical community, just as clarifying the impact of 
global warming or assessing the risks of rising multidrug resistance is the 
responsibility of similar specialists” (Johnston and Juengst 2018). Yet, and 
as I am sure both of those authors would agree, the constitution of the 
“biomedical community” is far too narrow and those who have access to 
the benefits of biomedicine are far too few. The clinically-guided benefits 
of GSTs discussed in this paper are typically enjoyed not by an imaginary 
public of all citizens, but by a demographically small slice of the white, 
middle- to upper-middle class (Reardon 2018).
There is also the crucial and intimately related issue of reproductive 
rights. What does it mean to critique technologies that, in principle at 
least, offer more reproductive autonomy when—as this very article is being 
written—there is an all-out assault on reproductive rights in the United 
States? This includes lawsuits from multiple states specifically designed to 
get a hearing in the new Supreme Court to overturn Roe v. Wade (Smith 
2019). In light of the work of the reproductive justice movement, how does 
one critique technologies that prima facie offer greater reproductive control 
(Ross and Solinger 2017)? And what does it mean to contest the categories 
of normality and abnormality when they help determine what insurance 
companies will or will not cover and what can be claimed as a harm or 
infringement in legal contexts (Campbell 2009)?
In short, critiques concerning the downsides of technologies such as 
GSTs that privileged groups can access and that historically oppressed 
groups cannot—and in many cases have been actively denied—could right-
fully be charged as itself an exercise in privilege. There is much merit to 
this concern. In fact, this is a concern that all scholars, but especially those 
working in bioethics, public health, and other health-related fields, should 
reflect upon as a matter of course. However, I find that this critique—and 
ones like it—are still worth carrying out. Here are two reasons why.
First, to understand this paper as implying that we should ban or dimin-
ish access to GSTs is to fundamentally misconstrue the arguments I have 
put forward. My analysis has been restricted to demonstrating that the 
processes of epistemic capture and value partitioning are unjust in the con-
text of GSTs when the epistemic framework(s) upon which they draw are 
indefensibly narrow. In other words, the normative weight of this paper 
turns primarily on the question of hermeneutic resources, a question that 
the work of Kristie Doston, among others, demonstrates to be of the utmost 
normative and practical import (Dotson 2012). My analysis, in other words, 
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is less a critique of GSTs or related biomedical technologies as such and 
more a critique of the interpretative scenes that such technologies stage and in 
and through which various clinical actors play. The agents in these scenes—
both the providers and patients, as well as the technicians and other spe-
cialists who are part of the larger interpretive processes—can change its 
interpretive parameters. I have not here made any arguments denying that 
the epistemic frameworks of GSTs could be appropriately expanded and 
altered.17 In short, the overarching point is as follows: the problem is less 
genetics or genomics and more how we interpret these bodies of 
knowledge.
Second, if one heeds the scholarship of those working at the intersection 
of disability and race, it becomes clear that combatting ableism without 
also combatting racism is as problematic and doomed to fail as combatting 
racism without combatting ableism (Ferri 2010; Bell 2011; Clare 2017). 
Arguably, it was Foucault who first argued that the historical rise of modern 
medicine, public health, and modern forms of governance operates though 
a “racialized eugenics” (Foucault 2008). That is to say, it operates through 
a principle that differentiates citizens through processes of racialization that 
function to decide “fitness,” a normative ideal of ability, within a given 
population as well as processes of abilitation/debilitation that function to 
determine the differential “fitness” of people according to categories of 
racialization. In short, the binary “normal/abnormal” is of the same cloth 
as the fabric of racialization that has historically undermined the realization 
of egalitarian principles and the possibilities of distributive justice in this 
country (among other places across the globe). In this light, making deci-
sions whose value is based upon the binary partitioning discussed above can 
be not simply ableist, but also racist—and even when made by those whose 
belong to social groups that have been historically oppressed.
Having said all this, a more practical concern remains: if one is con-
vinced by my argument that GSTs carry out epistemic injustice against 
patients through epistemic capture and value partitioning, what is one to 
do? There are many possible responses, but I will here outline four path-
ways that could assist in removing or at least ameliorating the harms in 
question.
17 Despite the salutary efforts of caring researchers, part of what is at issue here is the 
larger failure of translational work to be more inclusive and diverse with respect to public and 
clinical understandings of genetic variation and its links to human wellbeing (Burke et al. 
2011).
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1. Practitioners need to become adept in the hermeneutic resources 
of disability communities and other marginalized communities 
(Garland-Thomson 2012, 2015b). To take just one example with 
respect to intellectual disabilities, all practitioners should learn 
about the neurodiversity movement and incorporate its insights 
into how one thinks, talks about, and, where appropriate, treats 
cognitive differences. From a neurodiversity perspective, there is 
no “standard” brain or “default” way that one should think. 
There are those who are neurotypical in various ways and those 
who are neurodiverse. By refusing the binary between “normal” 
and “abnormal” and between “something’s wrong” and “every-
thing’s fine,” research that centers the experiences of people with 
disabilities can push back against the harms of epistemic capture 
and value partitioning.
2. Clinicians have a responsibility to recognize the authority of people 
with disabilities as experts about their own lives and communities and 
to elevate their voices (Reynolds 2018b). Medicine deals with biologi-
cal processes, not with the meaning-making processes of human life as 
it is actually lived. The meaning of cerebral palsy, for example, will not 
be found in medical textbooks; it will be found by listening to those 
who live with cerebral palsy. Although the role that medical providers 
play is absolutely crucial in many respects, one of the more important 
ethical tasks that medical providers have in many cases is to defer to 
the appropriate expert knowledge: those who have lived experience of what-
ever impairment is under discussion. To be clear, this does not mean talking 
to one person and getting their “take” on “what it’s like.” For over 
four decades now, a rich literature has grown in the field of disability 
studies that critically incorporates first- and third-person knowledge 
about various experiences of disability (Davis 2013). This field spans 
the humanities and social sciences and can provide significant insight 
into various sorts of disability experience in a critical, reflective, and 
more balanced manner.
3. If the many institutions of medicine are to take the call for social jus-
tice and equity seriously, there must be political pressure to make those 
institutions—and those that surround and support it, from housing to 
food access, from education to fair labor, etc.—better care for and 
represent people’s actual needs. Technologies like GSTs have emerged 
in a larger societal context with massive amounts of inequality and out 
of a centuries-long legacy of colonization and imperialism that touch 
nearly every place on the globe. There are many bodily differences 
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that do not automatically lead one to suffer or to be disadvantaged, 
but, given the world as we find it today, do in fact do require more 
support—In a just society that holds all humans to be equal, that sup-
port would be provided.
4. I agree with Koury et al. that the principles of evidence-based medicine 
must guide clinical decision-making, including decisions that involve 
genetic and genomic information. They write:
 Genomics is no different from any other scientific field except perhaps in the 
sheer volume of new information and technology expected to hit the health 
care market, and the fact that such information often has implications for the 
families of those who are tested. Although genomic medicine has been slow in 
adopting the principles of evidence-based medicine, it still needs to follow the 
principles of comparative effectiveness . . . the paucity of high-quality studies 
has contributed to the absence of evidence-based practice guidelines and to the 
differential uptake and reimbursement of these testing technologies in practice. 
(Khoury et al. 2008)
Evidence, including that from qualitative sociology, must bear on deci-
sions ranging from how various types of genomic information are commu-
nicated to whether certain sorts of information are communicated at all. For 
example, while I appreciate the work of Lázaro-Muñoz et al. to provide 
a rigorous taxonomy of debates concerning return of results in genomics, 
the question of “unknown impact of RoR [return of results] on partici-
pants,” as they phrase it, is not taken seriously enough (Lázaro-Muñoz 
et al. 2018). That empirical issue should, on my view, throw far more 
doubt on their suggestion—limited in that article to psychiatric genomics 
research—for providers to offer what they categorize as “likely clinically 
valuable findings.”
More to the point, the analysis provided here suggests that the issue 
ultimately turns less on which findings are offered and more on how they 
offered; this how is not simply with respect to modes of interpersonal com-
munication between providers and patients, important as that is, but also 
with respect to the epistemic frameworks at play in such clinical encounters. 
One implication of this study is that the latter concern may in fact be more 
decisive for health outcomes than the former.
In a study I find crucial to understand the ethical, epistemological, and 
sociopolitical stakes of GSTs, Werner-Lin et al. note that “novel diagnostic 
tools are often deployed before targeted therapies are developed, tested, 
or available” (Werner-Lin et al. 2019). That fact should cause far more 
pause as a notable body of research mounts suggesting that it is misguided 
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to think that more information is an unqualified good and that, to the 
contrary, it can in fact cause harm to patients in certain cases. Werner-
Lin et al. continue, “this ‘therapeutic gap’ between the ability to conduct 
genetic sequencing and the ability to fully understand what the test results 
mean, much less what treatments to offer, leaves families with complex and 
unclear information they cannot act upon with confidence during preg-
nancy.” And, I have suggested, this worry extends, at minimum, to pediat-
ric contexts as well. To sufficiently address this issue will require far more 
research and analysis and must, as I have suggested, extend to interventions 
that go beyond the clinical space itself.
To recall a concern announced at the outset of this study, “biomedical 
technology” is a difficult object for epistemological inquiry, including that 
of GSTs more specifically. Despite its difficulties, it is crucial for medical 
institutions and society more generally to better understanding the epis-
temic processes and effects put to work by these technologies. Without such 
understanding, the increasing incorporation of genomic information into 
clinical settings runs the risk of inadvertently harming some of the very 
people it is, however inequitably, currently equipped to help. These are 
harms that can and should be addressed.18
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